9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 8 Index

9.1 Responding to the mandate

9.2 What should be done to build the right amount of safety into roads ?

Highway 407 is a modern highway. By and large, it has been built to current highway geometric design standards. In some respects, those standards have been exceeded; in many cases, only minimum standards have been met. In a few instances, minimum standards have not been met. It is difficult to anticipate the safety of a highway that has not yet been used. However, in our opinion, Highway 407 is likely to have a similar level of safety as other 400 series highways in Ontario. Our review has resulted in two things. First, it has enabled us to respond to the committee's mandate. In so doing, it has also shown us that there are several measures that have the potential of enhancing the safety of Highway 407. We suggest that these measures be examined in detail immediately. Second, there is the broad issue of how to build an appropriate amount of safety into roads. The committee is concerned that present practice deals with road safety only implicitly, without using all available knowledge and without extracting the safety lessons from accumulated professional experience. We have included recommendations dealing with the procedures that should help build into roads the appropriate amount of safety. We suggest that public road administrations, such as the Ministry of Transportation, and the community of transportation design professionals examine this broad issue with respect to their own roles and responsibilities in providing safe and efficient streets and highways.

9.1 Responding to the mandate

MTO's geometric design standards are comparable to those used elsewhere in North America. Highway 407's safety design was based on the premise that if the current geometric design standards were maintained, the highway would have the accepted level of safety as set out by MTO. Although the committee questions this approach, we acknowledge that this, too, is common practice within the highway engineering profession. Highway 407 mostly met or exceeded the MTO design standards. The Provincial Auditor suggested that the value engineering process should be applied to other provincial highways. The committee agrees with this suggestion, however the value engineering process for Highway 407 was no more than a cost-cutting exercise. Future value engineering exercises should consider all the needs of road users, including safety. Safety needs must be explicitly evaluated in a manner similar to financial and environmental issues, and not simply for compliance to standards. The particular issues raised by the OPP were: The committee examined these issues and agrees with these concerns, which are discussed in Chapter 6. The committee did not agree with the OPP proposal for a median barrier. The value engineering process allowed for a reduction in the cost to build the first phase of Highway 407, as directed by the government. Implicit in the two value engineering studies is the assumption that if the current standards were met, the required level of safety would be maintained. Although the committee questions this approach, we acknowledge that this, too, seems to be common practice. The outcome of the value engineering process generated development alternatives. However, the failure to follow up on the recommendation in FENCO's independent assessment of the value engineering submissions, that safety trade-offs resulting from any reduction in standards should be evaluated through an explicit cost/benefit analysis, may have resulted in some of the features of the new highway being different from what they might otherwise have been. The geometric design features of Highway 407 reviewed by the committee mostly met or exceeded the MTO geometric design standards, except at the locations noted in the report. We also note that in some instances, while the letter of the standard has been met, its spirit has not been. The design of Highway 407 was based on the premise that if the current geometric design standards were met, the highway would have the accepted level of safety, as set out by MTO. Although the committee questions this approach, we acknowledge that this is common practice within the highway engineering profession. There was only one documented case of an explicit safety evaluation of any feature of the highway and that was the question of where to locate the lighting masts. It is the committee's view that the highway's safety was enhanced by the following features: illumination throughout, a median in excess of 22m, and paved shoulders. In various places in the report, we note that while opportunities to enhance safety existed during the design process, the committee has no documents to show that they were examined. These opportunities pertain to design decisions about the width of the median and its cross-section, protection of the lighting masts, the fill and cut slopes, the length of barriers, substitution of directional ramps by loop ramps, and the like. The committee did not have the time to determine the cost effectiveness of these opportunities. The committee did not have the time to identify all the promising courses of action and to analyze which of these, if any, are cost-effective. Based on our collective judgment, we recommend that, among other ways to reduce the frequency and severity of collisions, the following options be considered:

9.2 What should be done to build the right amount of safety into roads ?

The benefits of mobility are bought at a cost. The cost of mobility is not only a monetary one; but it also relates to noise, air pollution, frustration, expenditure of time and the cost of collisions, which include loss of life, personal injuries and property damage. Collisions are one of the costs of mobility. The frequency and severity of collisions is not unchangeable; it is subject to management by a variety of means. Some tools of safety management are oriented toward the driver, some toward the vehicle, and some toward the road and its environment. In our opinion, the management of road safety by engineering design and operations requires rethinking. This has implications for the highway engineering design profession, as well as for government and other agencies responsible for "delivering" road systems to the public. We say this for three reasons.
  1. Present practice in highway design is less than satisfactory. Details of what is not satisfactory are provided in the body of this report and do not bear repeating. In sum, we think that those who make decisions that materially affect road safety must do so on the basis of available factual knowledge. Just "designing to standards" is not thoughtful engineering and is inadequate, particularly regarding road safety. Yet it is evident that this represents the state of highway engineering design in many North American highway agencies today. Accordingly, we recommend that the government and professional associations examine the implications of current highway design practice with a view to ensuring that road safety is considered in an appropriate and explicit manner during the road design process.
  2. Road safety failures are not always obvious. If a bridge collapses or a basement leaks, the failure is manifest. Not so in road safety. A road safety shortcoming is a matter of degree and may become manifest only through a long history of collisions. For this reason, it usually remains unrecognized and unmitigated. Furthermore, the owner of the deficient bridge or basement will tend to seek redress, and those responsible for the failure will learn from their mistakes. None of this works well in road safety engineering. In addition, the traditional role of government in designing, building and operating roads is changing. We expect that more of the engineering will be done outside the civil service. We also expect that there will be more projects of the design-build kind. For these reasons, it is evident that building an appropriate amount of safety into roads requires a "guardian". The committee believes that the Ministry of Transportation is a sensible choice for guarding the interests of the public in road safety. Accordingly, we recommend that the Minister of Transportation examine the broad spectrum of issues, including those of responsibility and authority, relating to the question of how to ensure that an appropriate amount of safety is built into a road.
  3. It is evident from our discussions with the OPP and MTO that an opportunity exists for a cooperative sharing of information and experience. The OPP and MTO have valuable experience and important information, some of which is shared (e.g. the accident report form that is filled out for reportable motor vehicle accidents) and some of which is not shared (e.g. that which comes out of detailed accident reconstructions by the police). Similarly, there are analyses completed by MTO that would be useful to the OPP. Our impression is that there are currently inadequate institutional arrangements to facilitate the flow of information for the mutual enrichment of the police and the transportation professionals who design and operate roads. Accordingly, we recommend to the Minister of Transportation and to the Solicitor General of Ontario that steps be taken to enhance the cooperative sharing of road safety information and experience between MTO and the OPP.